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I. INTRODUCTION
Safety has always been a consideration in the systems
acquisition/procurement and design process, however its
primary emphasis has been centered on the operational phase
of the system's life cycle. With the ever increasing cost
of retrofiting or replacing operational weapon systems, it
became evident that safety had to enter the design and
procurement process at the earliest point possible and be
an active consideration throughout the system's li-fe cycle.
To accomplish this increased safety consciousness, System
Safety Engineering, or simply System Safety, was brought
into the process.
System Safety is defined in Military Standard 882B
CRef . 1 3 as "the application of engineering and management
principles, criteria, and techniques to optimise safety
within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time,
and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle."
The primary function of System Safety is the early iden-
tification and classification of hazards so that action may
be taken to correct the hazards prior to reaching final
design decisions. The earlier an unacceptable hazard is
identified and eliminated, the less the negative impact on
a project and the less the likelihood of a costly retrofit.
The person having the ultimate responsibility for the
implementation of a system safety program for new
acquisistions is the Program Manager. Though most Program
Manager* have been care-fully screened and have had training
in acquisition management, one area of unf ami 1 i ari ty and
weakness is often that of implementing MIL STD 882B and
maintaining an effective system safety effort.
It is the objective of this thesis to assist the
Program Manager in his duties involving system safety
management by providing a usable handbook to introduce him
to the principles of system safety and then to provide
practical guidance for the impl imentati on of MIL STD 882B.
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II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the adoption of System Safety as a formal
discipline, safety was an ad hoc methodology, with little
effort being made to actually design safety into the
systems. Once operational, a "fly-it, fix-it, fly-it"
approach was taken. Hazards which were identified during
operational use were either judged to be of low risk or
fixed by retrofit. In either case, weight and/or cost
penalties were considered acceptable. Due to the relative
inexpensi veness of the systems and the abundance of raw
materials, it simply was not cost effective to make System
Safety a major design factor.
Due to the ever increasing complexity of new systems
and skyrocketing cost of production which accompanied
modern technology, System Safety gradually evolved into
what it is today. It was no longer feasible to wait for
hazards to appear in the operational phase since system
replacement and retrofit costs had grown astronomically.
It became apparent that if safety was designed into
systems, life cycle cost could be reduced and system
reliablity increased. With this realization came a
multitude of instructions and directives from every
direction and it was soon evident that a standardized
approach to system safety was required for all the
services. To this end, MIL STD 882 and its subsequent
revisions were written.
MIL STD 882B, currently in effect, provides "uniform
requirement* for developing and implementing a system
safety program of sufficient comprehensiveness to identify
the hazards to a system and to impose design requirements
and management controls to prevent mishaps by eliminating
hazards or reducing associated risk to a level acceptable
to the managing activity (MA)." CRef. 13 This standard
provides specific system safety tasks -for both management
and engineering which may be imposed on all applicable DOD
acquisitions. The key individual in this process is the
Program Manager, for it is he who serves as the MA and
decides which tasks are appropriate for the program under
his control. This selection or tailoring of tasks to fit
the program is the first, the most difficult, and the most
important step in the implementation of MIL STD 882B. Once
accomplished, the Program Manager's primary system safety
functions are to monitor and assist the efforts of the
contractor in adhering to the establish System Safety Plan.
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III. METHODOLOGY
The basic premise in preparing this handbook was to
keep it simple and usable, not just another huge volume
filled with fact after fact that is read once, if that, and
then due to its appalling nature, stuck away and never seen
again. This handbook was to be a basic reference which
could be keep at the program managers desk and repeatedly
used to in his system safety endeavors. Accordingly, a
limit of 30 pages was established. Mi thin these pages,
there was to be sufficient material to provide a sound
introduction to the concepts of System Safety and to
provide practical guidance for the implementation of MIL
STD 882B.
The handbook first endeavors to impart an insight into
the importance of System Safety in the procurement process
and then present the general principles and fundamentals of
system safety. Once this is accomplished, practical
guidance and logical considerations in the implementation
of MIL STD 882B are presented. Here specific elements of
the standard »re highlighted and then the standard is
applied to three distinct weapon system acquisitions to
obtain a baseline selection of system safety tasks. To aid
in the selection process, a "Task Element Applicability
Checklist" is provided. With the aid of this checklist,
program managers can accurately make a baseline selection
of tasks to include in the system safety program for their
11
project. It must be understood that this is only a
"baseline selection" and that it must be molded to the
project at hand after careful consideration of all
available information.
Ideally, with the aid of this simple manual, program
managers should have a clearer understanding of the system
safety process and how to effectively apply MIL STD 882B to
the management of any project under their cognizance. It
should be noted that even though discussions are limited to
weapon system acquisitions, the same fundamental principles
apply to facilities acquisitions.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
System Safety is an essential element in the
acquisition of the weapon systems required -for the defense
of our nation. It is therefore paramount that anyone in
position to exercise control over the implementation of MIL
STD 882B (usually the Program Manager) fully understand the
importance of system safety to the acquistion process.
This handbook is an initial attempt to aid the program
manager in the management of the system safety aspects of
the program. It is not designed to be a definitive
reference to answer every relevant question on the subject.
Hopefully, however, it should better equip the Program
Manager to accurately estimate the complexity of the system
safety effort and to effectively apply MIL STD 882B to the
management of any given project.
To ensure that the above has been accomplished without
any serious omissions or errors, it is strongly recommended




A PROGRAM MANAGERS INTRODUCTION TO
SYSTEM SAFETY AND MILITARY STANDARD 882B
A. INTRODUCTION
This manual is not designed to answer every question on
the topic of System Safety Engineering. It endeavors,
however, to impart an insight into System Safety and the
importance it plays in the procurement process. Addition-
ally, practical guidance and logical considerations for the
application of Military Standard 882B to weapon system
procuements is provided. To achieve this end, first the
general principles and fundamentals of system safety
engineering are presented. Secondly, specific areas of MIL
STD 882B are highlighted, and lastly, to assist in the
actual implementation of MIL STD 882B, it is applied to
three separate weapon system procurements:
(1) Procurement of a major weapon system (a new
aircraft)
.
(2) Procurement of a minor weapon system
(a remotely piloted aircraft).
(3) Procurement of a modification/addendum to a
weapon system (an radar upgrade for an
in-service aircraft).
The above projects vary greatly in their scope and
complexity and each requires a system safety effort
tailored specifically to meet its individual needs. With
the aid of this manual, one should have a clearer
understanding of the system safety process and be better
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quipped to accurately estimate the complexity of the
system safety effort related to a given project and then be
able effectively apply MIL STD 882B to the management of
that project.
B. SYSTEM SAFETY — WHAT IS IT?
MIL STD 882B defines System Safety as "the application
of engineering and management principles, criteria, and
techniques to optimize safety within the constraints of
operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all
phases of the system life cycle." Notice specifically the
references to "optimize" and to "constraints". System
Safety is not to be feared as an all consuming monster,
blind to the limitations of one's particular project. It
must be considered as one of the elements to be optimized
along with many others. Also take note that it applies to
"all phases of the system life cycle". While safety has
always been a consideration in any new procurement or
design process, its primary emphasis has always been
affixed to the operational phase of the life cycle. Now,
however, it extends throughout the design, operation, and
disposal of the system.
C. THE FUNCTION OF SYSTEM SAFETY
The primary function of System Safety is the early
identification and classification of hazards in order that
15
measures may be taken to eliminate the hazards prior to
reaching -final design decisions. The earlier an unaccept-
able hazard is identified and eliminated or controlled, the
less the negative impact on the project and the less the
likelihood of a costly retrofit.
D. DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEM SAFETY
In the past, when systems were relatively inexpensive
and raw materials were plentiful, System Safety was an ad
hoc methodology. Little effort was made to design safety
into systems except to eliminate obvious hazards or those
hazards known to exist from previous experience. Once
operational, the "fly it - fix it - fly it" method was
utilized. Any identified hazard was eliminated through
retrofit or judged to be low risk items not requiring
retrofit. In either case, the weight and/or cost penalty
was considered acceptable. It simply wasn't cost effective
to make System Safety a major design consideration.
As system complexity grew, the role of System Safety
gradually changed to what it is today. Systems were no
longer inexpensive or easy to manufacture, the design
process became more sensitive to changes, and size/weight
tolerances became more critical. It was no longer feasible
to wait for hazards to appear in the operational phase be-
cause system replacement and retrofit costs had grown as-
tronomically. It soon became evident that designing safety
16
into a system could reduce life cycle costs and incrBatt
the system's reliability. "Fly it - -fix it - -fly it-
became "identify - analyze - eliminate".
Initial efforts to emphasize System Safety resulted in
various instructions and directives being issued by each of
the services. It soon, however, became apparent that a
standardized approach applicable to all the services and
all varieties of procurement was required. To this end,
MIL STD 882 and its subsequent revisions were written.
This standard made the developement of a System Safety
program a requirement and defined the roles of the Program
Manager and the contractor in implementing the program.
E. SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM PLANNING AND COSTS
A System Safety Program is a formal program with
definitive steps to ensure that safety is designed into
systems, subsystems, and support equipment. It is to be
set forth in the Statement of Work (SO*) of the Request for
Proposal <RFP) and in the Contract Data Requirements List
(CDRL) . In general, it specifies procedures, standards,
and testing requirements for the stated purpose of identi-
fying and eliminating or controlling safety hazards. In
that it is a part of the SOW and requires the expenditure
of manpower and material assets, its cost must be included
in that project budget. This is where far too many safety
efforts meet their untimely demise—at the budget chopping
17
block. While t dollars •upended on a safety effort is a
quantifiable figure, the benefits rmmpmd fro* the effort
^r9 not. Estimates of systems and lives saved by a safety
program *rm just that—estimates for which no tangible
dollar savings can be shown. While the cost effectiveness
is difficult to show and impossible to prove, it is the
Program Manager's job to ensure that System Safety is given
careful attention and adequate funding.
F. THE SYSTEM SAFETY PROC 3S
The System Safety Process is simply the logical
application of the System Engineering approach to obtain
the desired System Safety objectives. The primary elements
of this process »rm as followsi
(1) Lessons Learned - Probably the greatest proof for
the necessity of a strong System Safety program »rm
the multitude of accident and mishap reports.
Analysis of these reports have shown that a great
percentile of incidents are the result of a design
flaw tha could have been eliminated if safety had
been giv^n its just place in tha c sign process.
Use these reports to prevent the same design flaws
in new projects and whenever practical, utilize
systems and subsystems with proven track records.
<2> System Specifications - Precise definition of the
system and its bounds, being careful to include
all required maintenance and support facilities
and/or equipment and the anticipated operating
environments.
(3) System Hazard Analysis - This is an evaluation of
the complete system to uncover any design features,
system components, or any system interfaces that
might lead to or create * haze . Fault tree
analysis (FTA> and failure mode anc effects analysis
<FMEA) are often used for this purpose.
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(4) Hazard Identification, Categorization, and Evaluation
The hazard analysis will lead to the
identification of system hazards, which must then be
categorized as to potential danger and the
probability of their occurrence. Using this
information, careful evaluation must take place to
determine which hazards require design changes due
to either their severity or frequency of occurrence
or a combination of the two.
(5) Action to Eliminate or Control Hazards - The old
cliche "actions speak louder than words" applies
here. All the analysis and evaluation serves no
purpose if the appropriate corrective action is not
taken. Measures must be taken to track every hazard
until it is closed-out as directed.
(6) Modification of System Elements - The above steps
are iterative in nature. Once a modification is
made, a re-evaluation must be done to see if the
hazards were corrected or if any new hazards were
introduced.
<7> Effectiveness Evaluation - Included in this area ar*
Mishap Analysis and System Test and Demonstration.
This is done to verify the mission and cost
effectiveness of the modifications. The question
that must be answered is "Does the system still meet
design specifications with the incorporated changes
and have these changes eliminated or controlled the
known hazards?"
(8) Increased Safety Assurance and Re-application - The
resulting system is safer while still meeting the
mission requirements and the lessons learned *re
utilized for future systems.
G. SYSTEM SAFETY DEFINITIONS
The following definitions in conjunction with those
provided in para 3.1 of MIL STD 882B are terms wi±h which
one must be familiar when working in System Safetyi
(1) Contributing hazard - A condition which aides in the
fulfillment of a hazardous event.
(2) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) - A qual-
itative technique which evaluates the effects of
various failure modes on the safety of the system.
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(3) Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) - Similar to an FMEA,
but include* consideration of human error, pro-
cedural deficiencies, environmental conditions and
other events that might cause "normal" operations at
an undesired time and result in a hazardous
condi tion.
<4> Fault Tree Analysis <FTA) - A top-down evaluation
technique which begins with an undesired event and
proceeds through the system to identify the event or
combination of events which would have to occur to
cause the undesired event.
<5) Hazard Action Report (HAR) - A report which
identifies an existing hazard, the probability and
criteria for its elimination or control, a history
of action taken and verification that the criteria
has been met.
(6) Initiating hazard - A hazard or event which triggers
a sequence of hazardous events.
(7) Primary hazard - A hazard which directly and
immediately causes injury, death, damage, loss of
equipment, degradation of capabilities, or loss of
material
.
(8) Sneak Circuit Analysis - A computer aided process
for examinination of software and hardware to
identify latent (sneak) circuits and conditions
which inhibit desired functions or cause undesired
functions without a component failure.
H. MILITARY STANDARD 882B
Military Standard 882B provides "uniform requirements
for developing and implementing a system safety program of
sufficient comprehensiveness to identify the hazards to a
system and to impose design requirements and management
controls to prevent mishaps by eliminating hazards or
reducing associated risk to a level acceptable to the
managing activity (MA)". While MIL STD 882B, in many
respects, is very similar to its predecessor, it goes
bayond and provides task elements -for both management and
engineering/design. These tasks are to be tailored by the
MA to establish a safety program which meets the specific
needs of each procurement. Herein lies the heart of the
MA's role in the system safety effort—to evaluate each
project and select the appropriate tasks for incorporation
to contractual document. Once this is accomplished, the
MA's must monitor and assist the efforts of the contractor
in adhering to the established System Safety Plan.
I. SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND PRECEDENCE
In order to properly evaluate projects and accurately
select appropriate tasks elements, the MA must first
understand the basic requirements and precedence laid down
by the military standard. To this end a brief summary of
the major elements is provided below:
(1) The contractor shall establish and maintain an
effective and efficient system safety program. A
statement to this effect must be included in the SOW
and CDRL.
(2) Safety, consistent with mission requirements, is to
be designed into the system in a cost effective
manner. Hazards are to be identified, evaluated and
eliminated or reduced to a level acceptable to the
MA.
<3) Prior to system design, all applicable standards,
specifications, regulations, historical data and
lessons learned shall be reviewed for guidance.
During the project, thorough documentation of all
hazards shall be maintained and significant safety
data should be documented and submitted as lessons
learned.
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<4> The precedence for the handling of identified hazards
begins with the elimination or reduction to a level
acceptable to the MA through design changes. If
this is not possible, appropriate safety devices are
to be incorporated. Next in precedence is the
incorporation of hazard detection and warning
devices to warn personnel of the hazard. If all the
above are impractical, procedures and training shall
be used to reduce the risk. However, "without
specific waiver, no warning, caution, or other
written advisory shall be used as the only risk
reduction method for a Category I or II hazard...."
J. RISK ASSESSMENT
Effective implementation of a system safety program
requires proper assessment of the risk associated with any
identified hazard. Once this has been accomplished,
hazards may be prioritized in order that the potential risk
and the costs to reduce that risk may we properly weighed
and design decision made. To perform this prioritization,
it is necessary to consider both hazard severity and hazard
probabil ity.
Hazard severity primarily concerns the magnitude or
criticality (category I is catastrophic, II is critical,
etc.) to personnel safety or the successful mission
accomplishment and is qualitative in nature. Hazard
probability, however, is a measure of the likelihood of
occurrence of an event and though usually associated with a
quantifiable number, is often categorized qualitatively
(frequent, occassional, etc.). Though prioritization may
be simply a subjective evaluation of the above, it is
usually advantageous to utilize a risk assessment matrix
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(Figures 1 and 2 of Appendix A to MIL STO 882B provide two
samples of matrices) to provide qualitative prioritization
-factors.
One note of caution when performing risk assessment on
projects that were contracted when MIL STD 882 was
effective. Under 882, the hazard severity description and
category numbers where reversed (catastrophic was category
IV). Contracts under 882A agree with 882B.
K. MIL STD 882B AND THE LIFE CYCLE PROCESS
As stated previously, the system safety effort is to
extend through all phases of the life cycle process, and it
is important to be familiar with the safety requirements of
each of these phases. Accordingly,, a summary of the
primary system safety aspects of each phase is provided.
L. CONCEPTUAL/DEVELOPMENT PHASE
In this phase, the system safety activities are divided
into two primary functions—one for the system and one for
the program. For the system, a determination of the state
of safety and the requirements for safety for the various
alternatives under consideration must be made. It is this
determination that will ultimately provide the grounds for
design decisions. Key elements in this area »re a thorough
delineation of the operational and support requirements of
the system, a review of applicable "Lessons Learned", the
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performance of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis <PHA) and
associated review/design decision processes and
documentation.
The safety activities -for the program involve getting
the system safety effort rolling in such a manner that it
will continue throughout the life cycle. The earlier the
program is put into effect, the more effective it will be.
The primary item here is the development of the System
Safety Program Plan (SSPP) . The SSPP is normally writtan
by the contractor but for smaller programs it may be
written by the MA to reduce expenses. While the SSPP
should address the entire life cycle, its primary emphasis
may be focused on this phase since a review and update of
the SSPP is essential to each phase. It is also essential
that the System Safety Working Group be established and
take an active part in the review of design proposals and
of the PHA.
M. DEMONSTRATION/VALIDATION PHASE
The safety objectives of this phase Are, as the name
indicates, to demonstrate and validate that the designs of
the conceptual phase meet the desired specifications while
maintaining a satisfactory level of system safety. The
first step in accomplishing this goal is the review/update
of the SSPP by the MA. This is done to ensure that an
integrated system safety effort is provided, since it is in
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this phase that the system safety effort is the most
intensive.
Much of the system safety effort will involve
conducting numerous hazards analyses, such am the System
Hazard Analysis (SHA) , the Subsystem Hazard Analysis
(SSHA) , etc. Each of these analyses is designed to verify
that system safety is achieved in a particular area of
interest. Once these analyses have been completed,
measures must be taken to ensure that the hazards are
properly rectified. This is accomplished by the
impl i mentation of a hazard tracking scheme which follows a
hazard from discovery and documentation to ultimate
reconci 1 i at ion.
Test and evaluation procedures are to be reviewed from
a system safety aspect to ensure that no hazards are
introduced by test procedures. Additionally, training
plans, logistics and support plans, etc, must be reviewed
for safety considerations, and an advance look at the
projected production process and operations should be
conducted.
Finally, and most importantly, it must be verified that
what has been learned in this phase is added to the
requirements documents (SOW, Specs, etc) to ensure
inclusion in the following phases. The bottom line is to
ensure that system safety objectives are achieved while
still meeting design requirements and specifications and
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keeping within cost restraints. This n easy to may, but
mort often than not, very difficult to accomplish.
N. FULL SCALE DEVELOPEMENT
Here the transformation of validated designs into full
scale production occurs. This i« followed by rigorous
testing and analysis to ensure that the design lives up to
expectations. System safety's role, for the most part, is
a continuation of efforts started in the previous phase.
First the SSPP is reviewed and updated. If multiple
subcontractors Arn involved, an Integrated System Safety
Program Plan (ISSPP) is usually advisable. The ISSPP is
designed to coordinate the system safety efforts of the
subcontractors with those of the primary contractor.
Engineering designs must be reviewed to ensure incorpora-
tion of safety requirements and that hazards previously
identified have been corrected. All the various hazard
analyses may require updating in as much as here will be
the first chance to analyze the actual hardware and
software items and to see actual full system interface.
All tests conducted during this phase must be reviewed
to ensure that no further hazards have developed and that
the system is indeed ready for production. Additionally, a
look ahead at the production facilities should be made to
verify that hey are ready to safely handle the forthcoming
tasks. Finally, the system safety effort in this phase
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must bs documented and the program should be tailored for
the production/deployment phase.
0. PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE
The primary system safety objective of this phase is to
ensure that the system is produced in accordance with the
approved specifications and designs and that, after
post-production tests, it is deployed to the fleet for
operational use. To accomplish this task, first the SSPP
is updated to reflect the requirements of the phase.
Safety controls and inspections of the production process
and operations must be enforced. Evaluation of testing of
early production hardware/systems must be performed to
detect and correct any additional safety hazards. Various
Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) and Notices of Exception
(NOE) will most likely be submitted and must be reviewed
for their impact on system safety.
Once the system is actually deployed, fleet use
invariably defines new, unexpected hazardous modes of
operation and new procedures. NOE's and ECP's associated
with these findings must again be evaluated for safety
impact and acted on accordingly.
P. DISPOSAL PHASE
Though disposal of newly developed systems is not
usually an immediate worry, the system safety effort is not
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complete until this phase is considered. The SSPP should
contain provisions for the safe disposal of the system and
any of its components which might present potential haz-
ards. Items to consider are health hazards, contamination,
recyclabi 1 ity, etc.
Q. SELECTION OF TASK ELEMENTS
As previously stated, the heart of the system safety
effort for the MA is the selection of the task elements
which will meet the program safety requirements in a cost
effective manner. Once selected, these tasks are then
included in the SOW and will specify the contractual system
safety requirements for the program. In order to properly
select the appropriate tasks for a given project, the MA
must have a clear understanding of the system requirements,
specifications, program phases, and the safety requirements
identified by higher authorities. Once this is well in
hand, tailoring of MIL STD 882 system safety tasks may
commence.
To aid in the task selection/tailoring process, MIL STD
882B has provided Tables 1 and 2 and Section SO to Appendix
A for general guidance. The material presented therein, is
summarized and/or expanded in the following "Task Element
Applicability Checklist" (TEACL) in a manner designed for
clarity and quick reference. After a brief description of
a task, the TEACL will specify the usual program/life cycle
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phases of applicability and then present specific points to
assist in determining if the task is required/desired.
Utilization of this checklist format will enable the MA to
determine a baseline selection of system safety task
requirements which can then be weighed against project
requirements and cost constraints. Remember, however, that
a hasty elimination of task elements might well result in
future design flaws and ultimately greater expenditures of
both time and money.
R. TASK ELEMENT APPLICABILITY CHECKLIST
TASK 100 (System Safety Program) - Requires the
contractor to implement a system safety program.
....
- REQUIRED whenever MIL STD 882B is imposed.
TASK 101 (System Safety Program Plan) - Requires that a
SSPP be developed which will serve as the basis of
understanding between the contractor and MA on how the
system safety requirements will be achieved.
....
- Applicable to all phases.
....
- Highly recommended for all MIL STD 882B
procurements.
TASK 102 (Integration/Management of Associate
Contractors, Subcontractors, Architect and Engineering
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Firms) - Provide* the primary contractor and MA with a
means of establishing and maintaining an integrated system
safety effort with other contractors on a project. The
ISSPP is the basis of this integration.
....
- Applicable to all phases.
....
- Generally needed only on major systems where
numerous contractors are involved.
TASK 103 (System Safety ogram Reviews) - This task
requires the contractor to periodically report on the
status of the system safety program to the MA. This is in
addition to safety activities at milestone design reviews.
.... - Applicable to all phases.
.... - Recommended for early phases of most projects.
(Frequency of reviews vary with project and/or
system complexity.)
....
- May be needed to meet requirements for munition
safety boards, first flight readiness reviews, etc.
TASK 104 (System Safety Group/System Safety Working
Group) - The group assists the MA in the management of the
system safety program.
.... - Applicable to all phases.
.... - Generally required by service regulations fi ~ all
major projects.
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TASK 105 (Hazard Tracking and Risk Resolution) - A
procedural method to document and -follow all identified
hazards until ultimate resolution.
....
- Applicable to all phases.
....
- Critical to most projects to ensure proper
disposition of all hazards.
TASK 106 (Test and Evaluation Safety) - The purpose of
this task is to ensure that additional specific attention
is given safety in the test and evaluation process.
....
- Applicable primarily to the Conceptual and
Demonstration/Validation Phases.
....
- Recommended for all major weapon systems and for
minor systems where hazards to life are evident.
TASK 107 (System Safety Progress Summary) - This task
requires the preparation of periodic reports on the status
of the system safety effort.
....
- Applicable to all phases.
....
- Recommended for major projects and a good option
for all projects if funding permits.
TASK 108 (Qualification of Key Contractor System Safety
Engineers/Managers.) - Establishs qualifications for
contractor system safety personnel.
....
- Applicable to all phases.
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- Generally selected only -for major project* but
usually not necessary since contractors will
normally select well qualified personnel to
protect their own interests.
TASK 201 (Preliminary Hazard List) - Requires the
compilation o-f a preliminary list of potential hazards
which will enable the MA to better direct emphasis in the
system safety program.
....
- Applicable only to the early Conceptual Phase.
....
- Recommended for any project to get an early
indication of inherent safety design flaws.
TASK 202 (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) - Requires
performing and documenting a PHA to establish an initial
risk assessment of the concept or system. It will examine
alternate methods to reduce safety hazards while still
meeting speci f i cations/requirements.
....
- Primarily applicable to earlier phases.
....
- Recommended for all projects.
TASK 203 (Subsystem Hazard Analysis) - Requires in
depth analysis of safety hazards associated with the design
of each subsystem.
•-. - Primarily applicable to Demonstration/Validation
and Full Scale Development Phases.
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....
- Recommended for projects where multiple major
subsystems are involved.
TASK 204 (System Hazard Analysis) - Requires
performance of a SHA which examines the interface of all
subsystems in the operation of the system and how the
failure modes affect the overall safety of the system.
....
- Primarily applicable to Demonstration/Validation
and Full Scale Development Phases and to lesser
extent design changes in the Production and
Deployment Phase.
....
- Recommended for projects of all levels, since even
for a modification/addendum, a thorough SHA is
advisable to ensure no safety hazards have been
introduced.
TASK 205 (Operating and Support Hazard Assessment) -
This task requires analysis of hazards associated with the
environment, personnel, procedures and equipment.
....
- Applicable to all but Conceptual Phase.
....
- Recommended for all major or minor projects with
significant personnel interface/support require
merits or extreme environmental conditions.
TASK 206 (Occupational Health Assessment) - This task
performance documents health hazards associated with a
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system and recommends protective measures to reduce the
risk to an acceptable level.
....
- Applicable to all phases.
....
- Recommended when toxic materials or physical
agents (cold, heat, noise, radiation, etc) are
involved.
TASK 207 (Safety Verification) - Requires that
test/demonstrations be performed to verify compliance with
safety requirements for safety critical items.
....
- Applicable to Demonstration/Validation and
and Full Scale Development Phases.
....
- Required when system specification/requirements
and/or regulations/standards state that specific
safety guidelines be met.
TASK 208 (Training) - Requires certification and
training of personnel involved in the development, test,
and operation of the system.
.... - Applicable to all but Conceptual Phase.
.... - Generally not needed when dealing with established
governmental contractors.
TASK 209 (Safety Assessment) - This task requires the
contractor to document any residual safety problems and
special controls/procedures associated with the system.
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....
- Generally applicable to any phase.
.... - Recommended -For most projects. (If -funding
constraints require, this can be eliminated for
minor projects. Though the information provided
is generally available elsewhere, this can be
a single source of critical safety information.)
TASK 210 (Safety Compliance Assessment) - Requires
documentation of compliance with contractually imposed reg-
ulation, standards and laws to ensure safe system design.
....
- Generally applicable to all phases.
....
- Recommended for all major programs and required
for any program where regulations apply.
....
- For low safety risk minor programs and/or modifica-
tion/addendums, it may be the only safety analysis.
TASK 211 (Safety Review of ECP's and Request for
Deviation/Waivers) - Requires documented analysis of ECP's
and Requests for Deviation/Waiver.
....
- Applicable to all but Conceptual Phase.
....
- Recommended for all major /minor weapon system
procurements.
TASK 212 (Software Hazard Analysis) - Requires analysis
of software to ensure that safety hazards are not
inadvertantly introduced by software interaction.
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- Applicable to all but Conceptual Phase.
....
- Recommended -for any procurement in which critical
systems/subsystems are software controlled.
TASK 213 (GFE/GFP System Safety Analysis) - Requires
that GFE/GFP items are considered in a sa-fety analysis.
....
- Applicable to all but Conceptual Phase.
....
- Recommended only when GFE/GFP items interface
directly with new contractor developed hardware
or software in a new system.
S. APPLICATIONS OF MIL STD 882B
In the following three sections, the MIL STD 882B is
applied to three distinct weapon system acquisitions in
order to demonstrate its application at various levels of
system complexity and fiscal expenditure. In each case,
the nature of the acquisition is described and then some of
the considerations in the application of the military
standard are weighed. Next, though not discussed in
detail, the TEACL has been utilized to make a baseline
selection of MIL STD 882B task elements for inclusion into
a comprehensive system safety program. The results of this
baseline selection are summarized in Table I. It is
important to remember that this is only a baseline
selection to put the MA over the first hurdle. After this
selection is made, the MA must painstakingly weigh the
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myriad of -factors/constraints affecting each individual
project to develop a system safety program that is suited
to the project at hand.
T. MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM APPLICATION
Here MIL STD 882B is applied to the acquisition of a
replacement for the F/A-18 Hornet, an all weather fighter
and attack aircraft. Examining the operating environment
and aircraft missions several items are evident which will
aid in task selection. Its primary operational environment
will be off a carrier with all the associated hazards. It
will have guns and carry an assortment of air-to-air and
air-to-surface weapons. Its radar and avionics suite will
be highly software dependent, as most likely will be the
flight control system. It will be a massive project with
numerous sub/associate contractors. As Table I shows, any
acquisition of this magnitude mandates an extensive system
safety effort. Failure to identify and correct safety
hazards during development may result in loss of lives and
valuable aircraft, high retrofit expenditures and possibly
affect national security. Items selected here for a
baseline should, except under extreme funding limitations,
make up the final task selection package.
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U. MINOR WEAPON SYSTEM APPLICATION
Here the military standard is applied to the
acquisition of 100 remotely piloted vehicle/aircraft (RPV)
.
They will be used -for battle-field surveillance by the
Marines and will be launched and recovered at remote
airstrips. Additionally, it is anticipated that
hot-re-fueling will often be required to support ground
operations. It will be assumed that the decision has been
made to cut cost by purchasing a commercially available
aircraft and add surveillance, communications, and control
equipment. Additionally, much of the equipment to be
installed will be of f -the-shel f /GFE items. The greatest
chance of hazards to life will be from loss of RPV control
and from hot-refueling accidents. Since the aircraft and
much of the necessary equipment will already be proven, it
will be necessary to develop the control system and
software, test them separately and then test the integrated
system.
While the above program is far less complex than the
previous one, the system safety effort, though reduced, is
still substantial. As shown in Table I, with the exception
of the SSHA, most of the same engineering analyses and task
should still be conducted. The greatest change is in the
management tasks where significant reduction has occured.
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V. MODIFICATION/ADDENDUM APPLICATION
Her* MIL STD 882B is applied to the development and
retro-fit o-f an advanced radar system for an in-service
aircraft. The upgrade has been required to keep pace with
a newly developed air-to-air missile who's range surpasses
that of the aircraft's current radar. It is clearly
evident that an effective system safety effort can be
accomplished with relatively minimal task imposition since
there is little chance that this change could induce
significant safety hazards. The tasks selected &re shown
in Table I. It is important to note that even though only
a few tasks have been selected, management has been
directed to incorporate system safety into the system's
development (Tasks 100 and 101) and that engineering is
required to conduct sufficient analyses to determine that
no new safety hazards have been introduced into the current
aircraft due to this update.
W. NOW OR LATER
This manual has presented basic information and
provided guidance on the application of System Safety
Engineering and MIL STD 882B to the military weapon system
acquisition process. Utilizing the information herein, one
should be better able to effectively apply MIL STD 882B to
any given program. Again, it is important to realize that
no two programs are alike and that the baseline task
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selection obtai ~d with the TEACL is just that—a baseline
which must be molded to the individual program.
Every program manager has the responsibi 1 tiy of
implementing a system safety program for systems under his
cognizance and MIL STD 882B provides an effective method
for doing just that. Although short term costs are
incurred, life cycle costs Are reduced because of fewer
accidents,, lower maintenance down time, and fewer retrofit
requirements and most importantly, lives will be saved.
The extent to which these savings are realized is directly
dependent on the program manager's commitment to the system
safety program. Taking a phrase from an old TV commercial,
"you can pay me now, or you can pay me later". The prudent
program manager will do the former.
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Table 1. MIL STD 882B Application Matrix
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